When the parties to the Israeli-Palestinian peace process reached an impasse, despite the efforts of US Secretary of State John Kerry, it was quite clear that the process is on the verge of failure. There is no use in placing blame beyond the immediate cause: the insistence of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu that the recognition of Israel as a Jewish state be a cornerstone of the negotiations. What is the point? So that Mahmoud Abbas, president of the State of Palestine, will demand a Muslim state for the Palestinians?
Interview with Mr. Mohammed Al-Madani
Seeking to clarify the Palestinians’ stance, I met with Mr. Mohammed Al-Madani, a member of the Central Committee of the Fatah political party, and interviewed him on several key issues related to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
I am glad to say that during our very long discussion Mr. Al-Madani mentioned many times the term “reconciliation,” which indeed gave me a lot of hope for future life in our region.
Question: Why did the Palestinian Authority apply to the United Nations during the negotiations?
Answer: In our view there is no contradiction between our request for non-member state membership in the UN and negotiations on the basis of a clear and agreed-upon frame of reference, especially commitment to the 1967 borders with minor, agreed-upon exchanges and a halt on settlement activities.
Q: How about the Arab Spring?
A: Expediting the peace process and achieving the two-state solution on the basis of international legality will serve the interests of stability and peace and counter the situation of uncertainty and fear that engulfs our region.
Q: And the Palestinian Spring?
A: Demonstrations on the Palestinian streets are focused on two demands: an end to the split with Hamas in Gaza and an end to Israeli occupation.
Q: Your attitude to the Arab League Peace Initiative?
A: Unfortunately, the Israeli side ignores the Arab Peace Initiative, which entails solutions to Israeli concerns including the recognition of the State of Israel.
Q: The two-state solution?
A: We have accepted the two-state solution since 1988, while the one-state solution is not our choice.
Q: Refugees?
A: The Arab Peace Initiative includes an agreed-upon and just solution to this issue. No solutions will be imposed on any party.
Q: Jerusalem?
A: In the framework of a permanent settlement, Jerusalem can be the capital for [both states, with] East Jerusalem the capital for the State of Palestine and West Jerusalem the capital for the State of Israel.
Q: Settlements?
A: Negotiations cannot be resumed without a total halt on settlement activities, which make negotiations void and futile.
Q: End of the conflict?
A: Signing a peace agreement on the basis of international legitimacy, the two-state solution and agreement on solutions to all permanent status issues [will] end the conflict, end all further claims of the two parties, and pave the way for a historic reconciliation.
Commentary on options for an agreement
US President Barack Obama and his secretary of state, John Kerry, invested real effort into solving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Unfortunately they lacked an understanding of the inherent needs of the two sides and set unnecessary priorities that are unrealistic and at times even ignore the interests of other international partners. The gaps between the Israeli and Palestinian positions are profound, as was clear to anyone who has followed the failure of the negotiating team in the days of Ehud Olmert, former Israeli prime minister.
All this is the true but necessary response to the key question: “What next?” Accusations will not help. The Palestinians are mistaken in believing that the UN institutions are a solution for them. While such solutions might give massive support to the Palestinians, the international damage for Israel would be severe and the Palestinians would not achieved their desire for a Palestinian state. Thus, only dialogue with Israel and its agreement will allow the Palestinian state to be sovereign and independent.
Either way it is clear that, in terms of Israel’s status quo, some people favor it while others disagree, which the US does not understand. Israel must say that the United States is wrong to believe in the illusion of a permanent agreement because we have not yet offered an alternative to the status quo. To do this one can learn from similar conflicts. In recent decades several violent conflicts have erupted that have similarities to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict: They all have elements of the struggle between two national movements, dealing with a conflict between historical narratives, military occupation, terrorism and action against terrorism, settlement in occupied territory and the involvement of neighboring countries. Although these conflicts are not fundamentally religious conflicts, they have religious foundations, which generally helps reach an agreement.
All the components in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict are similar to those in Cyprus, Bosnia, Kosovo and even in Kashmir between India and Pakistan, though the conflict in the Middle East, which is often a more intense area, has a smaller chance of resulting in an agreement.
One would not compare the status of Jerusalem to Nicosia in Cyprus or Mitrovica in Kosovo. In every one of these conflicts there were local, regional and international efforts to reach a permanent agreement, and all these attempts failed. The last time this happened was in Cyprus, in which the entire international community was involved, with the support of UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan; but the objections of the Greek Cypriots prevented the achievement of an agreement. Kosovo gained independence during this time, but Serbia still refuses to recognize that the conflict has concluded, and in Bosnia, despite the Dayton Accords that ended the war and killing, the conflict has not yet come to an end.
We may say without hesitation that if the United States and Europe are unable to solve the problems of Cyprus and Kosovo, they will have even more difficulties in finding an easy solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, because of all of the pending complications.
It has to be made explicit that what is being offered: economic peace, which is an alternative to Benjamin Netanyahu's final agreement, if not an excuse to avoid it. (Some are tacit agreements and and some are completely one-sided but may help the other side.)
What does that mean in the case of the negotiations in the Middle East? On the Israeli side that means fewer additional checkpoints in the West Bank and granting Palestinians more freedom of movement, ending the rest of Israel's economic siege of Gaza (this matter possibly can be implemented in coordination with Egypt), the transfer of area C, which civilians and the Israeli military currently control, and the transfer of certain areas to Palestinian Authority control to ease the transition in the West Bank, installing several isolated outposts, and a tactical agreement on the avoidance of further Israeli construction of settlements.
For the Palestinians to agree to such moves, a significant change must come about, even if gradually. A discourse among Palestinians about Israel must be implemented in the education system and public places. This must include reducing the support for those people whom the Palestinians call “martyrs.” Also it may be necessary that the Palestinians create some internal order and come to an agreement between the Fatah party of the Palestinian Authority and the government of Hamas members in Gaza. It is clear that as long as there are two Palestinian authorities that sometimes fight one another, there will be no realistic chance of a real agreement between the Palestinians and Israelis.
Some of these moves will be difficult for Israel, and some certainly will make it difficult for the Palestinians. Certainly at the beginning, both sides will state that these moves are not acceptable. What both sides, and eventually also the United States, need to understand is that the chance of a final agreement at the moment is an illusion. If carried out slowly, there is a chance to advance, slowly and with much patience, toward a broader agreement.
So at this time, we should learn the lessons of the 2000 Camp David talks that failed without having an alternative plan.
In conclusion, the preparation of alternative options based on lessons as mentioned above is imperative, and from there we can continue on in the hopes of finding a final peace agreement.
Eliezer Glaubach-Gal, Ph.D., is the chair of the Y. Foerder Liberal Institute and a former Jerusalem city council member.