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T.G. Weiss: Developing a Longer-Run Perspective on US - UN Relations
Written by Thomas G. Weiss, Presidential Professor and Director, Ralph Bunche Institute for International Studies
Wednesday, January 23, 2002
Delivered at an International Symposium on the United States and the United Nations, “Exploring the Future of U.S.-U.N. Relations,” January 23, 2002
As Americans we are not well known for our historical memory, and I would like to underline the importance of a slightly longer-run historical perspectives in trying to explore the future of U.S.-United Nations relations. There have been some dramatic changes since 9/11, but we should remember our French friends who caution “plus ça change, plus ça reste la même chose.” At the outset of this crisis, both historical perspectives and common sense frankly were in very short supply. For instance, our Texan President was using his best wild West rhetoric about getting the bad guys “dead or alive,” while the writer Alice Walker was arguing that “all the terrorists need is love.” With some distance, we should now be better able to be more analytical in trying to understand the implications of September 11 for conflict and conflict management in several parts of the world, and for U.S.-U.N. relations more generally.
The facility with which many persons toss about “paradigm shift” is unsettling. We have witnessed plenty of ups and downs in the past decade, and not everything has changed as a result of the tragic events of September. One of the problems with today’s discussion of the opportunities and obstacles to improved U.S.-U.N. relations, indeed, a problem with virtually any discussion here in Washington, D.C., is that the “long-run” tends to be synonymous with the next public opinion poll.
By way of analogy, until the tragic attacks of September 11, 2001 riveted the world’s attention upon an international response to terrorism, humanitarian intervention had been one of the thorniest questions facing diplomats in New York and scholars everywhere. Actions in Kurdistan, Somalia, Haiti, Rwanda, and the Balkans had led to such contentiousness and consternation in the international community that an independent international commission was created in 2000 to study this issue, and I had the privilege of serving as its research director. The idea was to try and dig ourselves out of the trenches that separated much of the West and the South, that separated proponents of human rights and of state sovereignty.
Yet, the war on terrorism chased humanitarian intervention from policy radar screens even before the commission’s report, The Responsibility to Protect, was even presented to the U.N. Secretary-General in mid-December 2001. Yet, I for one am sure that humanitarian intervention undoubtedly reappear once again when Burundi erupts, or in the wake of military action in Afghanistan. Indeed, the challenges of humanitarian access and of assistance and protection of civilians are familiar, as are the cast of characters from humanitarian agencies who will have to interact with outside military forces.
But for the moment, suddenly no one is interested in the topic. I mention this fact not as an aside but rather because it is instructive to think about the veritable roller coaster ride that Washington and the U.N. have been on concerning this topic in the last decade. In the aftermath of the Gulf War, following the intervention on behalf of the Kurds in April 1991, there was a powerful feeling that there was nothing that humanitarians and human rights advocates could not do; the end of the Cold War signaled not only a U.N. renaissance but even the birth of a “new world order” according to former President Bush. At that time, there was no limit to the possible cooperation between the United States, other great powers, and the world organization.
Then only three years later in April 1994, the opposite sentiment dominated the public policy atmosphere. We (the U.S., and the U.N. more generally) apparently could do nothing in the face of Rwanda’s tragic genocide of some 800,000 people as a result of the shadow cast by the earlier debacle in Somalia. Suddenly, in 1999, depending on one’s point of view, the humanitarian intervention vintage was either the annus mirabilis or horribilis because of massive efforts in Kosovo and East Timor.
When I was caught in Edmonton on September 11, I was asked to participate in a series of panels at the University of Alberta where I had been stranded for a week until airports reopened. I speculated at that juncture that resulting from the horrible events there might be two silver linings concerning American foreign policy, both of which had a certain resonance with our northern neighbors. I was basically wrong about the first one in the short run although maybe not in the longer term that was my view that the attacks with such low-level technology (knives) would doom the revival of the ABM in the form of the BMD (Ballistic Missile Defense) or NMD (Nuclear Missile Defense). I clearly was off the mark, although I still believe that there will be much greater resistance down the line when it comes time to pay the bills for missile defense systems that will be competing with other bills for the economy, social security, and domestic security measures. So that there is still a chance that I may turn out to be correct.
The second silver lining that I thought would materialize, and here I have been somewhat more accurate, regards exploring a better future for U.S.U.N. relations. Undoubtedly, I thought, there would be increased relevance for multilateralism in American foreign policy. The two factors that usually explain U.S. ambivalence and sometimes outright hostility toward international cooperation are an exaggerated concern with maintaining sovereign prerogatives and exceptionalism (that is, we are so special that we need not play by the rules that we expect other countries to respect). Neither sovereignty nor exceptionalism has disappeared, of course, but I believe that both have been attenuated as a result of September 11 and provide a way to build better U.S.U.N. relations in the coming years. Let me explain why.
Ironically, the Bush administration came to office pooh-poohing the role of the federal government in domestic matters and downplaying the role of anything other than American unilateral-ism in the international arena. Both have proved shortsighted and inapplicable to today’s reality. Domestically, we have seen an impressive expansion of the federal government to provide the kinds of services or “public goods” that only a federal government can provide. I would argue that internationally we will also see a similar expansion of centralized activities, which can only occur when governments work together and not separately. On both conceptual and practical fronts, then, multilateralism has made a definite comeback since September 11.
Conceptually speaking, the terrorist attacks brought home in a crystal clear manner all of the rhetoric about “interdependence” that often is set aside here in Washington although many international relations specialists have been putting it into everything that we write since the 1970s. For us, the reality of a smaller planet is palpable, and the new global agenda (including international trade, finance, health, environment, weapons proliferation, and terrorism) requires transnational rules. But there were two undeniable facts driven home on September 11:
• benign side of globalization (faxes, air travel, money transfers, immigration) were used as weapons of war with many international as well as national dimensions;
• the reality of people in a global market place: some 80 countries with nationals in the World Trade Center, and 17 lost more than 70 persons each.
It is harder and harder to deny that we are living in a globalized world, and this conceptual reality is become more and more obvious. My argument is that it should become obvious, not just to analysts but now even to the administration, that global scourges like AIDS and environmental deterioration, and not just terrorism, require efforts for which the United Nations is uniquely qualified. Fewer and fewer foreign policy challenges are amenable to going it alone. International cooperation is less an option than a necessity in the twenty-first century.
Practical actions are not different from the conceptual. Just as federal government involvement has been required for security within the country, greater international cooperation is no less obvious for international peace and security. The number of reasons for the United States to cooperate comes from enumerating a simple list of practical requirements: our need for better intelligence, overflights, access to ports, tightening financial measures against terrorism, troop contributors, and the list goes on. These could not have been realized without widespread international support. It is foolish to think that the United States could have proceeded as effectively in Afghanistan without such substantial international cooperation.
In operational terms, then, “multilateral” is now the operative word, or at least it is no longer considered anathema in the White House. Indeed, during the campaign and during the administration’s first months, the dominant reality was unilateralism, or how the U.S. could go it alone. The Bush administration came to the White House deeply distrustful of the so-called blanket multilateralism that had been central to the Clinton administration’s foreign policy. The present administration thus sought to free itself from the constraints of a number of international agreements and regimes into which one or another of the preceding administrations had entered. In particular, the Bush team hinted that U.S. soldiers would no longer participate in U.N. or NATO peacekeeping.
Condaleeza Rice argued, for instance, that marines should not escort kids to kindergarten.
But all of this changed dramatically on September 11. It is clear that the United States is vulnerable to international threats, and that sustained multilateral cooperation is essential to confront the danger. The choice is not between unilateral and multilateral approaches, but rather what variety of multilateralism. The Bush administration realized that capturing Bin Laden and destroying his Al Qaeda network would require close and sustained international cooperation. We could not fight, and certainly not succeed, by going it alone. Moreover, cooperation would be necessary not only with our Western allies but with a wide range of other governments as well. These include not only such formerly traditional adversaries as Russia and China, but also states like Pakistan and its rival India, and former Soviet republics such as Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan, and Islamic states like Egypt and Saudia Arabia. The search for helping hands worldwide was crucial, and it signifies a profound change of course for the administration.
I suppose that one might argue that this born-again multilateralism merely is a temporary expedient and merely a tactical operational reality, a kind of hiccup in official American attitudes. But I believe that this change runs deeper because it must or we will be unable to accomplish the foreign policy goals that the members of the administration, indeed, all of us seek to achieve. In particular, the role of U.N. will be massive now that we have begun to use the “N” word, for nation-building, and also for the massive humanitarian, reconstruction (IBRD and U.N.), and political transition in Afghanistan that is a second front in the war and not an afterthought. In order to win this war, more than munitions and marines need to be expended. And the U.N. system has a comparative advantage in this work.
It is useful to think over the historical changes in U.S. approaches to the United Nations. As I look back at the last half century, I would say that in 1950s-1960s, the U.S. actually relied on U.N. in many situations from Korea to Suez to Congo, which was the origin of “Let Dag do it.” Then in the 1970s-1980s, beginning with Henry Kissinger, the U.S. pushed the unilateral option to the hilt. Maximum hostility characterized American relations with the developing countries, and withdrawal from organizations became a reality. In the 1990s there was a tendency to turn over messes to the world organization after other efforts had been engaged. Post September 11, my own sense is that there could and should be a return to the 1950s and 1960s reliance on, even a mild enthusiasm for, multilateral solutions to many--obviously not all but many problems.
The very quotable former U.N. Under-Secretary-General Brian Urquhart summarized changes in thinking about our current situation: “It was clear long ago, except to a small Stone Age and Flat Earth minority, that full national independence and isolation are no longer possible for any state.” Sir Brian’s generalization applies to all countries, our own included although we have more than our fair share of dinosaurs and flat-earthers.
Let’s think about what helpful multilateral efforts happened after 9/11. Within hours of the attacks, the U.N. Security Council passed unanimously a tough resolution requesting all states to cooperate in the war against terrorism. And the General Assembly followed suit. A day later, NATO invoked Article 5 of its treaty that declared the attack on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon an attack on all members. These were important parts of the war effort. They were all multilateral.
The September 12-13 decision to make good on international treaty commitment to pay back our lamentable U.N. arrears reflected a new and hopefully more routine use of and confidence in the world organization. I would speculate, for instance, that if the Durban Conference on racism were held after early September, it would be impossible for U.S. to slam door and simply walk out with Israel. It would undoubtedly do its diplomatic homework to ensure a spot on the Human Rights Commission.
It is going to be increasingly awkward and counterproductive to simply say “no” to sensible initiatives held dear by our allies. A partial list would include the Kyoto protocol limiting greenhouse gas emissions, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, the International Criminal Court, and the enforcement provisions of the efforts to control biological weapons as well as small arms. This kind of knee-jerk negativism will not facilitate our efforts to build coalitions against terrorism or other issues of importance.
It is tempting but ultimately myopic to pursue a purely opportunistic approach, or what Richard Haass, the National Security Council’s head, called “à la carte multilateralism.” A successful strategy to decrease American vulnerabilities to terrorism, or for that matter to address environmental collapse or the AIDS pandemic requires systematically and routinely more not less cooperation. In short, the United Nations is integral to the realization of U.S. objectives and vital interests.
For better or worse, then, any American administration is the most critical element in successful initiatives by what is usually dubbed the “international community” of states. U.S. leadership is absolutely essential. It is a necessary and sometimes even a sufficient condition for successful international responses.
The unprecedented military and economic power of the United States is the main obstacle as well as the main opportunity for improved U.S.-U.N. relations. The unmatched capacities and incentives to opt out or to act alone will be tempered with the recognition that fewer and fewer problems are amenable to unilateral solutions, and that multilateralism expands rather than shrinks options in the pursuit of bona fide national interests. Responses to September 11 should not mean that multilateralism is a temporary expedient for a short war on terrorism but rather an approach that would serve as a solid springboard to pursue multilateral approaches to other global problems. The transnational character of an increasing number of foreign policy issues compels an unprecedented degree of multilateral cooperation.