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CALENDAR OF EVENTS

October 2024
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Speeches

B.D. Schaeffer: The George W. Bush Foreign Policy and the U.N.

Delivered at an International Symposium on the United States and the United Nations, “Exploring the Future of U.S.-U.N. Relations,” January 23, 2002

As important as the United Nations may be, it is only one component of U.S. international relations and is subject to broader concerns. This fact is illustrated by the dramatic swing in America’s relationship with the U.N. in 2001. At the beginning of the year, America and the U.N. were the best of friends. Relations were the best since the early 1990s when the first Bush Administration, flush from the end of the Cold War and the Gulf War victory, openly expressed the idea that the U.N. would finally fulfill the dreams of 1945. We all know that optimism soon foundered on the shoals of Somalia, Rwanda, and mounting arrears in America’s payments to the U.N.

However, the relationship again seemed bright following the remarkable compromise forged by former U.S. Ambassador to the U.N., Richard Holbrooke, in December 2000. Working with the U.N., Ambassador Holbrooke succeeded in lowering America’s assessment for the U.N. regular and peacekeeping budgets, a change long resisted by the other nations of the U.N.1 Soon after that agreement, the U.S. Senate and the House of Representatives passed legislation to pay the second and largest at $582 million of three scheduled arrears payments to the U.N. Unfortunately, the rest of the spring and summer of 2001 led to a steady decline in U.S.U.N. relations. The arrears payment was, unfortunately, captured by domestic politics and was not sent to the President until after September 11.

U.N. officials, domestic critics, roundly chastised the Bush Administration and some of America’s allies for being “isolationist” or “unilateralist” because it disagreed with the prevailing international opinion on several key issues, such the Kyoto Protocol on global warming and the Administration’s determination to erect a missile defense system.
Many pundits interpreted America’s ejection from the U.N. Human Rights Commission and the International Narcotics Control Board as punishment for the Administration’s position on these issues. If so, that punishment did not chasten the Administration or bring it into line with prevailing international opinion.

In July, the Administration objected to the U.N. Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in all its Aspects because conference recommendations would have, in the opinion of the Bush Administration, violated the Second Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. The Administration also sent a low-level representative to attend the World Conference Against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia, and Related Intolerance as a protest to objectionable language in the draft declaration, including the ‘Zionism is racism’ proposition and issues surrounding compensation for slavery.

Many critics of President Bush spun these events into examples of him of wanting America to go it alone. They argued that the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon forced him to realize this was impossible and led him to recognize and appreciate the value of international organizations like the United Nations. For instance, former Senate majority leader George Mitchell, said that President Bush has succeeded “in part because he has simply discarded almost everything he said on foreign policy prior to September 11.”2 Washington Post columnist E.J. Dionne wrote “It’s hard to see the president restoring the unilateralist tinge that colored so many of his early foreign policy choices. Winning the battle against terror required an end to unilateralism and the construction of a broad international coalition.”3

I have to wonder whether these folks are living in the same world as I am. These comments are either uninformed or a deliberate misinterpretation of the Administration’s policy, because the Bush Administration was never isolationist or unilateralist. For instance,

• President Bush’s campaign website stated that he supported payment of arrears to the United Nations if its bureaucracy was reformed and America’s assessment was reduced4a position consistent with the bipartisan Helms-Biden legislation on arrears payment and U.N. reform. Both of these goals were largely met by Ambassador Holbrooke’s December 2000 deal with the U.N. and President Bush upheld his side of the bargain by signing the arrears payment into law. I expect him to support the third arrears payment as well, provided the U.N. meets the requirements in Helms-Biden.

• President Bush has been consistently pro-trade before and after September 11, despite the objections of many powerful opponents to free trade in America on the right and the left. He vigorously pushed for Trade Promotion Authority (fast track) since being elected to the White House and U.S. Trade Representative Robert Zoellick was critical in successfully concluding the World Trade Organization ministerial meetings in Doha last November.

• Candidate Bush favored intervening abroad if the mission was “in America’s national interest.”5 When asked what his threshold for “national interest” was, he defined it as “Whether our territory is threatened, our people could be harmed, [or] whether or not our defense alliances are threatened.”6 The war on terrorism in Afghanistan meets this pre-September 11 definition.

These campaign promises do not reflect an “isolationist” or “unilateral” foreign policy. Instead they represent a foreign policy that is worldly, but without the Clinton Administration’s excessive emphasis on multilateral acts. The previous Administration seemed eager to intervene only when the American interests were not at stake and only with international approval.

That is not to say that the measuring stick of unilateral action is useless. In my mind, national interests select themselves by passing the unilateral question: Is this important enough to do unilaterally? This does not mean that unilateral action is the preferable course, but if necessary is it important enough to do without the support of our allies or over the objection of an organization like the U.N.

The terrorist attacks on September 11 clearly meet that threshold and tragically underscore the need to fight the war on terrorism regardless of international support. Once the national interest was clear, President Bush acted and would have acted even if the U.N. had not supported him. To the credit of the Member States, the United Nations strongly supported America’s war on terrorism.

I see the Bush Administration’s foreign policy as the mirror image of the Clinton Administration’s foreign policy, both containing the same elements, but with the order of priority reversed. The Bush Administration’s foreign policy is a realist foreign policy, what Richard Haass, Director of the Office of the Policy Planning Staff at the U.S. Department of State calls “hardheaded multilateralism.”7 Most should be familiar with the policy because every nation aside from the U.S. under the Clinton Administration practices it. But in the interest of thoroughness, “hardheaded multilateralism” dictates that a nation should seek out international support provided that support does not undermine its national interests. Stated differently, a nation should support multilateral initiatives that serve its interests and oppose those that do not.

The war on terrorism is a case in point. Since September 11, America’s preeminent national security priority is winning the war on terrorism. In order to effectively curb terrorist groups that act globally, America must gain the support and assistance of other nations. In addition to extending the war on terrorism to areas that might otherwise be beyond U.S. influence, a multilateral coalition against terrorism provides America with basing and overflight rights for its armed forces, human intelligence to compliment its extensive electronic capabilities, logistical support, cooperation in criminal investigations, and greater security for American facilities and troops in other nations.

With these benefits in mind, the U.S. forged a coalition of willing allies in the war on terrorism and welcomed U.N. support through Security Council resolutions and General Assembly declarations. Though not strictly necessary, this support provided valuable diplomatic and economic support for America’s war on terrorism. It also defused embryonic criticism of neo-colonialism when the time came to establish a post-Taliban government in Afghanistan. However, the Administration also clearly rejected a wider coalition that threatened to hobble efforts to win the war on terrorism in general and the conflict against the Taliban in particular.

The war on terrorism illustrates the pragmatism of the Bush Administration. Global problems like international terrorism cannot be solved unilaterally. The Administration recognized this and, despite its awareness of the weaknesses of multilateral efforts and coalitions, decided to forge a temporary coalition to respond to that transnational problem. That willingness to utilize multilateral institutions when necessary does not, however, signal a sea change in Administration policy. It will continue to reject ill-conceived treaties and agreements regardless of their noble intentions or international popularity. Supporting ineffective treaties based on empty rhetoric is poor foreign policy and ultimately undermines the goals of the treaty or agreement. As noted by Richard Haass:

We are willing to listen, learn, and modify policies when we hear compelling arguments. But we will not go along simply to get along…. By the same token, we do not take lightly the costs to ourselves and to others when we forego participation in some multilateral initiative. In the future, we will give consultations every reasonable chance to produce an acceptable compromise. And if we conclude that agreement is beyond reach, we will explain why and do our best to put forth alternatives.8

You’ll notice that the Administration has not modified its opposition to the Kyoto Protocol one inch. On the contrary, the Administration has since been joined by Japan, which has decided to indefinitely postpone plans to implement the Kyoto Protocol due to the treaty’s onerous economic costs.9 President Bush has similarly announced his intention to abandon the Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty and erect a missile defense system. These decisions have elicited less reaction in the press and in diplomatic circles than predicted.

I believe the relatively minor reaction is a sign of the times. In the aftermath of September 11, people in the U.S. and abroad understand the necessity of elevating “national interests” over secondary or tertiary issues like the Kyoto Protocol. As noted above, the Bush Administration has always been actively engaged with America’s allies and international organizations on national priorities. Thus, Administration has not changed its tune as much as September 11 altered perception of the music being played by the Administration.
In a nutshell, America should and will employ the full spectrum of the tools of statecraft to protect its national interests, including working with the United Nations, but be willing and capable of acting alone when necessary. Multilateralism is a tool that America should use to achieve a useful objective. It should not be the objective.

So what does this mean for U.S.U.N. relations in the near future? I think it portends a rocky relationship, but one in which both parties clearly understand the other’s position. Realism is about prioritizing. The major flaw of the Clinton administration’s foreign policy is that minor issues were given the same weight as priority issues, in essence rendering nothing a priority. The Bush Administration has been very forthright in its foreign policy and can be expected to stand by its statements. This is a sharp deviation from the Clinton Administration, which often failed to stand by or support its rhetoric. This should be welcomed by other nations, even if they may not like what they hear.

Notes
1 On December 23, the U.N. member states agreed to reduce the amount paid
to the regular budget by the United States from 25 percent to 22 percent,
beginning in January 2001, and the amount paid to the peacekeeping budget
from 31.4 percent to 27.58 percent, beginning in July 2001. See Brett D.
Schaefer, “Keep the Cap on U.S. Contributions to the U.N. Peacekeeping
Budget,” Executive Memorandum No. 714, The Heritage Foundation, January
29, 2001, at http://www.heritage.org/staff/schaefer.html.
2 As reported by Ramesh Ponnuru, “Get realist,” National Review, Volume 53,
Issue 25, December 31, 2001.
3 E. J. Dionne Jr., “A New and Improved George W.,” The Washington Post,
October 12, 2001, p. A33.
4 “George W. Bush on Foreign Policy,” Issues 2001: Every Political Leader on
Every Issue, at http://issues2000.org/Celeb/George_W__Bush_Foreign_Policy.
htm#Internationalism.
5 “George W. Bush on Foreign Policy,” Issues 2001: Every Political Leader on
Every Issue, at http://issues2000.org/Celeb/George_W__Bush_Foreign_Policy.
htm#Internationalism.
6 “George W. Bush on Foreign Policy,” Issues 2001: Every Political Leader on
Every Issue, at http://issues2000.org/Celeb/George_W__Bush_Foreign_Policy.
htm#Internationalism.
7 Richard N. Haass, “American Foreign Policy After September 11th,” Director
of the Office of the Policy Planning Staff, Remarks to the World Affairs Council
of Northern California, San Francisco, CA, November 16, 2001, at http:/
www.state.gov/s/p/rem/index.cfm?docid=6310.
8 Richard N. Haass, “American Foreign Policy After September 11th,” Director
of the Office of the Policy Planning Staff, Remarks to the World Affairs Council
of Northern California, San Francisco, CA, November 16, 2001, at http://
www.state.gov/s/p/rem/index.cfm?docid=6310.
9 According to the BBC (January 3, 2001), the Tokyo newspaper Yomiuri
Shimbun reported: “The Central Environment Council, a government advisory
body, has said in a report that, for now, industries will not be given any
regulations to follow and, instead, will be allowed to combat gas emissions
on a voluntary basis.” See “Japan Gets Cold Feet,” January 9, 2002, at http: //www.globalwarming.org/polup/pol1-9-02.htm.